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Abstract
People behave pro-socially in a Eide variety of situations that standard economic theory is unable
to eHplain. Social comparison is one eHplanation for such pro-social behaviorI people contribute
if others contribute or cooperate as Eell. This paper tests social comparison in a field eHperiment
at the University of Zurich. Each semester every single student has to decide Ehether he or she
Eants to contribute to tEo Social *unds. We provided 2500 randomly selected students Eith
information about the average behavior of the student population. Some received the information
that a !"#! percentage of the student population contributed, Ehile others received the
information that a relatively $%& percentage contributed.
The results shoE that people behave pro-socially, conditional on others. The more others
cooperate, the more one is inclined to do so as Eell. The type of person is important. We are able
to fiH the OtypesP by looking at revealed past behavior. Some persons seem to care more about the
pro-social behavior of others, Ehile other OtypesP are not affected by the average behavior of the
reference group.
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*+,&%-./I public goods, donations, conditional cooperation, social comparisons
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2Social Comparisons and Pro-social Behavior
Testing ‘Conditional Cooperation’ in a Field Experiment
1any important activities, such as charitable giving, voting and paying taHes cannot be eHplained
by standard economic reasoning. So, for eHample, people pay taHes although the eHpected utility
theory Eould predict otherEise, due to the loE probability of getting caught and being penali\ed
:e.g. Wlm et al., 1992@. In a large number of laboratory eHperiments, the self-interest hypothesis
Eas rebected Eith respect to contributions to public goods :for surveys, see e.g. cedyard, 1995@.
W recent study on eHperimental Ultimatum dames in 15 societies around the Eorld reveals that
ethe canonical model of the self-interested material pay-off maHimi\ing actor is systematically
violatedf :Henrich et al., 2001I 77@.
Wttempting to eHplain such results, recent theories on pro-social behavior focus on the
relationship and interdependence of the people involved :for a survey, see *ehr and Schmidt,
forthcoming@. In deciding Ehether to cooperate in a social dilemma situation, people may care
about the pro-social behavior of the other persons involved. Such social comparisons, Ehen
contributing to public goods, stand in contrast to standard economics theory, Ehere individuals
alEays suboptimally contribute, due to the inherent incentive structure of such situations. People
contribute conditional on the pro-social behavior of others by being more Eilling to contribute
the more others contribute. This effect of social comparison and so-called Oconditional
3cooperationP may be due to various motivational reasons, such as OconformityP to social norms or
OreciprocityP.1
Testing social comparison is faced Eith many difficulties. The behavior of an individual may, for
eHample, be positively correlated Eith the behavior of the reference group due to the fact that the
group behavior affects the individualPs behavior. But it may also bust be the aggregation of
individual behaviors :e.g. 1anski, 2000@. Similarly, it is not sufficient to compare onePs
eHpectations about othersP behavior Eith onePs oEn behavior. Even if the correlation betEeen
eHpectations and onePs oEn behavior is positive, as predicted by the theory on Oconditional
cooperationP, causality is not clear. EHpectations about others do not necessarily trigger behavior,
but behavior influences eHpectations. Such a Ofalse consensusP effect :e.g. Ross et al., 1977@ can
occur, because people Eho cooperate may mirror their oEn behavior based on other peoplesP
behavior, or they may Eant to bustify their oEn behavior. To eliminate the problems of hoE to
measure social comparison, one can eHperimentally manipulate the beliefs about the behavior of
the group. Previous studies on social comparison in social dilemma situations used laboratory
eHperiments.2 Only a feE studies, hoEever, eHplicitly test conditional cooperation. *ischbacher,
dhchter and *ehr :2001@, testing conditional cooperation in a laboratory public good game,
conclude that roughly 50 percent of the people behave like conditional cooperators. To avoid the
difficulty of applying the results from laboratory eHperiments to conditions outside the lab
situation, Ee use a different approach and test conditional cooperation in the field.
                                                
1 See, for eHample, 1essick :1999@ and *ehr and dhchter :2000@.
2 See, among others, *alk et al. :2002@, Brandts and Schram :2001@, ieser and van Winden :2000@ and Offerman,
Sonnemans and Schram :199U@.
4This paper presents a field eHperiment, using the decisions of students at the University of Zurich
on Ehether or not to contribute to tEo Social *unds administered by the University. Students
have to decide each semester totally anonymously Ehether to contribute to the tEo *unds or not.
We knoE the decisions of these students over the last nine semesters, Ehich results in a huge
panel data set :around 1Z0P000 observations@. *or the field eHperiment, 2500 students are selected
at random. The University administration provided them Eith information about the behavior of
other students supplied by us. In the field eHperiment, Ee provided one half of the subbects Eith
the information that relatively feE of the other students :4Uj of the student population@
contribute to the tEo *unds, and the other half that relatively many of the other students :U4j@
contribute to the *unds. The loE contribution rate corresponds to an average over a longer time
period, Ehile the higher one corresponds to the last semester. In the variation of the variable of
interest :the behavior of the group@, Ee did 0%1 use deception, but the real contribution rate.
Wccording to the theory of conditional cooperation, social comparison in this situation should
lead to higher contribution rates Ehen students are presented Eith the information that many
others contributed. This prediction is not trivialI if students behave according to pure altruism
theories :e.g. Ylotfelter, 1997I 34-35@, they reduce their oEn contribution Ehen informed that the
other students are already contributing.
The results of the field eHperiment support the theory on conditional cooperationI peoplePs
behavior varies depending on the pro-social behavior of others. The contribution increases if
people knoE that many others contribute as Eell. HoEever, the effect is limited to certain OtypesP
of peopleI Ee determine the OtypesP by looking at past revealed behavior and analy\e their
reactions to othersP behavior. People Ehose decisions are indifferent react to the information
about othersP behavior the strongest.
5To our knoEledge, this paper presents evidence for the very first time on conditional cooperation
outside the laboratory situation. In a similar field eHperiment on donations, cist and cucking-
Reiley :2002@ analy\ed the impact of Oseed moneyP on charitable donations. When they
eHogenously increased the seed money, Ehich can be interpreted as the donations by others, from
10 to U7 percent, donations increased by a factor of siH, Eith an effect on both participation rates
and contributions. This result may also be interpreted as a positive correlation betEeen the giving
of others and the giving of the individual donor.3
The paper is organi\ed as folloEsI section II presents the field eHperiment and the data. Section
III derives hypotheses and the empirical strategy to test them. In section IV the results are
presented. The last section V offers an evaluation of the results and discusses their relevance.
!!" #$%&'(%)*%+$,%-.(/-'('/./
The field eHperiment Eas implemented in a naturally occurring decision situation at the
University of Zurich. Each semester, every single student has to decide anonymously Ehether or
not he or she Eants to contribute to tEo Social *unds l in addition to the compulsory tuition fee.
On the official letter for reneEing their registration, the students are asked Ehether they Eant to
voluntarily donate a specific amount of money :YH* 7.-, about USm 4.20@ to a *und Ehich offers
cheap loans to students in financial difficulties andnor a specific amount of money :YH* 5.-,
about USm 3@ to a second *und supporting foreigners Eho study for up to three semesters at the
University of Zurich. Without their eHplicit consent :by ticking a boH@, students do not contribute
                                                
3 In another field eHperiment about donations, *alk :2003@ offered potential donors Eith no gift, a small gift or a
large gift in the solicitation letter. The relative freouency of donations increased 75 percent if a large gift Eas
Uto any *und at all. The panel data is composed of the decisions of all students for the nine
semesters since the Einter semester 199Zn99 up to and including the Einter semester 2002n2003.
We observe the decisions of 37,U24 students, Eho decide on average 4.75 times, depending on
hoE many semesters they have already attended University.
In the eHperimental intervention, Ee selected 2500 students of the student population at random
and provided them Eith additional information about the tEo *unds. With the official letter for
reneEing the registration and the decision about contributing to the tEo *unds :for the Einter
semester 2002n2003@, the administration supplied the students selected Eith differing information
about the behavior of other students. The sheet of paper that the various treatment groups
received differed only Eith respect to the eHact information given :see the appendiH for a sample
information sheet@. Tue to the Oinstitutional differenceP that freshmen have to pick up the
registration form at the counter of the administration office, only students Eho decided at least
once in the past are included in the treatment groups. Wll other students constitute the control
group. Ws some students decided not to reneE their registration anymore, Ee could observe the
decisions of 21Z5 subbects in the field eHperiment.
The main part of the field eHperiment provides the students Eith information about the behavior
of others. Table 1 shoEs the tEo treatments testing for conditional cooperation.
TWBcE 1 WBOUT HERE
We provided 1000 students Eith the information that a relatively !"#! percentage of the student
population :U4j@ contributed to the tEo *unds in the past, and another 1000 students Eith the
                                                                                                                                                             
incorporated compared to the Ono giftP-treatment. This eHperiment focuses more on the interaction betEeen donor
and recipient than on social interactions betEeen donors, as in our field eHperiment.
7information that a relatively $%& percentage :4Uj@ contributed to the tEo Social *unds. The
information is based on real contribution rates, but refers to different time periods. The higher
contribution rate applies to the Einter term 01n02 :as indicated on the sheet for the subbects@. The
loEer contribution rate indicates the average over the last ten years. Ws some of the subbects did
not reneE their registration, Ee observe someEhat less than 1000 subbects in each treatment.
In addition to these tEo basic treatments, Ee included an OeHpectationP treatment in the
eHperiment. *or one group of 500 students, Ee elicited eHpectations about the behavior of others
by asking them to guess hoE many other students :as a percentage of the total student population@
contributed to 2%1! of the *unds. The students could return the sheet indicating their eHpectations
free of charge by putting it into the official envelope provided by the University administration.
There Eere monetary incentives for the students to give their truly best guessI the estimate closest
to the real contribution rate earned a voucher for music or books valued at YH* 100 :about USm
75@, and there Eas a cinema voucher valued at YH* 20 :about USm 15@ for the five neHt best
guesses. *rom the eight students Eho guessed the correct amount, U7 percent, Ee selected the siH
Einners of the vouchers at random. 25Z made a guesses :out of the 431 students in this treatment
Eho decided to reneE their registration@. This constitutes a return rate of 5Z.0 percent, Ehich is
high for a OouestionnaireP. People Eho contribute to the *unds are more likely to return the sheet.
HoEever, Ee are not interested in the level of contribution, but in the correlation betEeen
eHpectations about othersP behavior and onePs oEn behavior.
Table 2 shoEs the summary statistics for the control group and the treatment group. Ws the
assignment Eas random, no significant differences emerged betEeen the characteristics of
subbects in the treatment group and the rest of the student population. The slight difference in the
Znumber of semesters and age are due to the fact that, in the control group, some freshmen are also
included, Ehereas there are no freshmen in the treatment groups.
TWBcE 2 WBOUT HERE
Students decide anonymously at home about the contribution to the tEo Social *unds l having
different information about other studentsP behavior at their disposal. The analysis concentrates
on contributions to at least one of the *unds, although students have to decide Ehether or not to
give to tEo different *unds. We use contributions to at least one *und firstly because, most
students contribute either to both *unds or donPt contribute at all, and secondly, because the
results do not change Ehen other dependent variables are included, and thirdly, it constitutes the
loEer limit of contribution. *or details on contribution to the tEo *unds and an analysis of
behavior over time, see *rey and 1eier :2002@.
The design of the field eHperiment presented here and the decision setting have tEo clear
advantages over previous studiesI
:1@ *or at least tEo decades, laboratory eHperiments have challenged the standard economic
assumption. While eHperimental research leads to many insights about the basics of
human behavior, it is still unclear eHactly hoE these results can be generali\ed outside the
laboratory situation. *ield eHperiments can close this gap by looking at naturally occurring
decisions settings, Ehile still controlling for relevant variables.
:2@ Tue to the panel structure of the data set, pro-social preferences, as revealed by past
behavior, can be included in the analysis. This alloEs us to identify hoE different OtypesP
of people react to social comparison. To analy\e such a ouestion Eith revealed behavior
has many advantages over the ouestionnaire approach.
9!!!" 0%1/2$3+/&(45*3.1%6$6
There are, of course, many motives Ehich may trigger contributions to a good cause or a public
good, like OEarm gloEP :see e.g., Wndreoni, 1990@. But these motives are completely independent
of the behavior of others in the group. In this paper, Ee are mainly interested in the effects of
social comparison, i.e. Ehether peoplePs behavior is affected by Ehat others do in the same
decision situation.
The hypothesis, Ehich Eill be tested in this paper, assumes that people react positively to the
behavior of others. No one likes being the only one Eho contributes to a good cause and no one
likes being the OsuckerP Eho is Obeing free riddenP by others. The most distinctive prediction of
such a theory Eould be that individual "Ps probability of contributing increases Ehen the
percentage of individuals 3 :bq1,r,n] b≠i@ Eho contribute increases Eithin a given group.
4,5%1!+/"/I People behave pro-socially conditional on the behavior of others. The
individual behavior varies positively Eith the average behavior in the group. Therefore,
the probability of subbects contributing to the Social *unds in treatment 64"#!7 is
eHpected to be greater than subbects in treatment 6)%&7.
The hypothesis is based on a broad notion of social comparison. The idea that the more others
contribute, the more oneself gives, may be based on various motivational reasonsI firstly, people
may Eant to behave in an appropriate Eay and to conform to a social norm :e.g. 1essick, 1999@]
secondly, people have some sort of fairness preferences such as Oineouity aversionP :e.g. *ehr and
Schmidt, 1999@ or OreciprocityP :e.g. Rabin, 1993@] or thirdly, contributions by others may serve
as a signal for the ouality of the public good, or for the organi\ation Ehich provides the good in
the end :e.g. a charity@ :e.g. Vesterlund, 2003@. The feE studies Ehich try to evaluate in the
laboratory Ehether people undertake social comparison out of conformity or reciprocity mostly
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conclude that their results cannot be eHplained by reciprocity, but rather by conformity
:Schroeder et al., 19Z3] Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2002] Bardsley and Sausgruber, 2002@.
*olloEing this hypothesis, there are tEo Eays of testing this theory, both of Ehich Ee apply in
this studyI :1@ EHpectations about the behavior of others should positively correlate Eith onePs
oEn behavior, as found in various studies :e.g., see Selten and Ockenfels, 199Z] Yroson, 199Z]
TaEes et al., 1977@. HoEever, the evidence does not reveal the direction of causality. It may be
the case that it is not eHpectations Ehich trigger behavior, but that behavior influences
eHpectations. Such a Ofalse consensusP effect :Ross et al., 1977] TaEes et al., 1977@ can occur
because one probects onePs oEn behavior onto others, or because behavior needs to be bustified.
:2@ The second approach to test social comparison is to analy\e it in an eHperimental setting,
Ehich alloEs one to vary the average behavior of the group at random. In a laboratory
eHperiment, *ischbacher, dhchter and *ehr :2001@ solve the causality problem by using the
strategy method. Subbects in their laboratory public good game have to decide hoE much to give
to a public account, given the contributions of others. The study concludes that roughly 50
percent of the people increase their contribution if the others do so as Eell. Similar results are
found by *alk, *ischbacher and dhchter :2002@, Eho get their subbects to play tEo separate
public good games simultaneously. The authors find tEo social interaction effectsI firstly, people
give more to the group Eith high cooperation rates, and secondly, the contribution Eithin one
group depends positively on othersP contributions. W number of other studies in economics do not
test the effects of social comparison eHplicitly, but the results of public good eHperiments shoE
that individual contribution varies Eith the mean contribution of the group :e.g. ieser and van
Winden, 2000] Offerman et al., 199U] Sutter and Weck-Hannemann, 2003@. Wndreoni and
Samuelson :2003@ shoE in their tEice-played prisonersP dilemma game that small stakes in the
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first game alloE people to reveal their Eillingness to cooperate and to assess the propensity of
others to cooperate. The behavior of others in the first game positively influences the behavior in
the second laboratory game. 1ost studies about conditional cooperation are based on laboratory
eHperiments. W non-laboratory eHception is provided by Wndreoni and Schol\ :199Z@, Eho find
that onePs oEn donation depends on the donations of onePs reference group. Their results shoE
that, if the contribution of those in onePs social reference group increases by an average of 10j,
then the eHpected rise in onePs oEn contribution rises by about 2j to 3j. HoEever, because the
reference group is constructed Eith socio-economic characteristics, it is not a direct test of hoE
people react to the behavior of others. In our field study, Ee eHperimentally induced beliefs about
the behavior of others, Ehich is based on real contribution rates by using variations over time in
contribution rates.
People may be heterogeneous in their reaction to social comparison. TEo different sorts of
heterogeneity may be important for the analysis of our resultsI :1@ Only certain OtypesP of people
are sensitive to the behavior of others. While some persons vary their behavior according to the
average behavior in the group, others are not affected by the behavior of others. dlaeser,
Sacerdote and Scheinkman :199U@ shoE in their study of social interaction effects on criminal
behavior that some people are not influenced by the behavior of others, the so-called OfiHed
agentsP. This result compares to results from laboratory eHperiments Ehere a substantial number
of the subbects behave completely selfishly, Ehereas others shoE some sort of pro-social
preferences.4 :2@ Everybody may react to the behavior of others, but people are heterogeneous
Eith respect to the threshold Ehere they change their oEn behavior. Whereas certain people start
                                                
4 See, for eHample, Wndreoni and Vesterlund :2001@, Eho reveal that about 44j of their subbects are completely
selfish, Ehile others are driven by pro-social preferences.
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to cooperate Ehen they reali\e that a small minority does so, others only start to cooperate Ehen
they knoE that a large mabority also cooperates. Ws our eHperimental intervention induces beliefs
about contribution rates of 4U and U4 percentage, only people Eho have a threshold in betEeen
these boundaries are eHpected to react to the eHperimental intervention.
Both aspects of heterogeneity lead to the eHpectation that only a small fraction of people Eill
react to the eHperimental intervention. Wnd although the OtypesP are randomly distributed over the
tEo treatment groups, it is important to control for personal characteristics in order to isolate the
effect of social comparison.
In the folloEing section, Ee test the hypotheses and present the results.
!7" 8-/&56$6(/-'(9%6:&.6
!. #$%&' #)$ *%+,-./0 ,$1 234%56,6./$' !7/86 6+% *%+,-./0 /9 #6+%0'
In a first step, Ee analy\e Ehether the elicited eHpectations about the behavior of others and onePs
oEn behavior correlate positively. Students eHpect, on average, 57 percent of their felloE
students to contribute to both Social *unds :see appendiH for the distribution of eHpectations@. On
average, they underestimate the real contribution rate of U7 percent of the students. In our
conteHt, hoEever, the interesting ouestion is Ehether eHpectations have an influence on onePs
oEn pro-social behavior.
We observe indeed that the higher the eHpectation of the students about the average group
behavior, the more likely it is that these students are Eilling to contribute. The coefficient of
correlation betEeen the eHpectations eHpressed and the contribution to at least one *und is 0.34.
*igure 1 plots the contribution rate and the eHpectations :grouped in increments of 5 percent
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points from 0-5j to 95-100j, Ehich leads to 20 groups@. The figure shoEs that the positive
effect is substantial. W change in the perceived cooperation rate of others by ten percentage
points, evaluated at the mean eHpectation, raises the probability of contributing by more than siH
percentage points.5 This result corresponds Eith the results of various laboratory studies.
HoEever, as discussed above, the causality is not at all clear. W Ofalse consensusP effect may be at
Eork, Ehere people probect their oEn behavior onto others. Similarly, dlaeser et al. :2000I Z33@
found evidence of such an effect in their study about trust. They concludeI erthe best Eay to
determine Ehether or not a person is trustEorthy is to ask him Ehether or not he trusts others.fU
But due to the problem of causality, it is important to eHperimentally induce beliefs in order to
analy\e hoE people react Ehen actually presented Eith the relatively !"#! or $%& contribution
rates of other people.
*IdURE 1 WBOUT HERE
*. *%+,-./0,: 0%'4/$'%' 6/ .$185%1 7%:.%9' ,7/86 6+% 7%+,-./0 /9 /6+%0'
In a second approach, Ee test Ehether people adapt their behavior Ehen presented Eith a
relatively !"#! or $%& contribution rate on the part of others. The results of the field eHperiment
are consistent Eith the hypothesis that people are partly driven by Osocial comparisonPI the
probability of students contributing correlates positively Eith the mean contribution rate in the
reference group. The percentage of students contributing to at least one of the *unds increases
more than 2.5 percentage points Ehen they receive the information that U4 percent of the other
                                                
5 The vector of the marginal effect in a probit analysis is 0.00U2 :s.e. 0.0011@.
U HoEever, *ehr et al. :2003@, in their large-scale combination of survey methods Eith eHperiments, cannot
reproduce these results. In their study, enone of the survey measure of trust are good predictors of trustEorthiness in
the eHperimentf :p. 12@.
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students contribute, compared to the information that only 4U percent do so. But the difference is
not statistically significant at a conventional level :t-valueq1.199, ps0.231@. HoEever, such a
result may be due to heterogeneity in peoplePs behavior. Students in the treatment groups are not
deciding for the very first time Ehether to contribute or not. 1any students act in a habitual Eay
and either never or alEays contribute to the Social *unds. One should therefore not eHpect a large
effect from social comparison. Tespite the fact, that in the field eHperiment people are randomly
selected, Ee control for individual heterogeneity by estimating a conditional logit model Eith
personal fiHed effects, in order to get rid of much of the noise.
Table 3 presents the conditional logit model, Ehere the dependent variable takes the value 1
Ehen the subbect decided to contribute to at least one *und, and 0 otherEise. Personal fiHed
effects and time dummies are incorporated. The control group consists of all students not in the
treatment groups. The model can therefore test the effect on the contribution of being in one of
the tEo treatments and l more essential for this study l Ehether there are differences betEeen the
tEo treatments.
TWBcE 3 WBOUT HERE
The results of Table 3 support the theory of Oconditional cooperationPI people Eho are presented
Eith a high contribution rate are more likely to contribute than people Eho are told that not so
many others contribute to the *unds. W χ2-test of differences betEeen the tEo coefficients for the
tEo treatments shoEs that they are statistically significant at a 95j-level :χ2:1@ q 5.44,
ps0.0197@. The difference in behavior due to othersP behavior is substantial, especially if one
takes into account the specific features of the naturally occurring decision setting. *irstly, as the
eHperimental intervention is based on 891:8$;contribution rates, Ee do not induce eHtreme
cooperation rates. The difference betEeen 4Uj and U4j of students contributing is relatively
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modest compared to past laboratory studies Ehere people are confronted Eith eHtreme cases,
such as \ero contribution rates :see for eHample, Weimann, 1994@. Our results therefore provide
even stronger support for Oconditional cooperationP. Secondly, the students face a dichotomous
decision :Ehether to contribute or not@. This leaves little room for marginally adbusting onePs
behavior. Wgain, it is remarkable that students change their behavior at all. To take as the
dependent variable the amount paid to the *unds, Ehich can take the value YH* 0.-, 5.-, 7.- or
12.-, depending on the studentsP choice to contribute to both, or neither, or only one specific
*und, does not change the results. Thirdly, none of the subbects are contributing for the first time,
so contributing may have become a kind of habit, Ehere social comparison may lose importance.
Thus, the results from the field eHperiment shoE that, even in a naturally occurring situation,
people react to relatively small changes in the cooperation rate of others.
Table 3 also shoEs that people react in an 8/,<<+1-"98$;&8, to the induced !"#! or $%&
cooperation rates. Students "09-+8/+ their Eillingness to contribute Ehen presented Eith many
others doing so. This difference is statistically significant at the 99j-level. But they do 0%1
.+9-+8/+ their Eillingness Ehen only a feE others contribute. Wlthough the difference has the
eHpected sign, it is not statistically significant at the conventional level. This result is surprising,
because one could have eHpected that people hate being in a minority of people behaving pro-
socially Ehile others free-ride. HoEever, the results of the field eHperiment shoE that people
mimic the behavior of free-riders far less than often assumed. But students behave pro-socially if
they see that many others do the same. In the present eHperiment, using 891:8$ contribution rates,
people increase their pro-social behavior if many others do so, but do not decrease it Ehen many
free-ride.
1U
To go into greater detail, the neHt section addresses the ouestion of Eho is in fact most sensitive
to the behavior of others.
;. <+/ .' '%$'.6.-% 6/ 6+% 7%+,-./0 /9 /6+%0 4%0'/$'?
One can eHpect that not all individuals behave in a cooperative Eay conditional on the behavior
of others. Numerous studies find heterogeneity of individual preferences, and therefore of
cooperative behavior, in social dilemma situations. dlaeser et al. :199U@ eHplicitly incorporate
different OtypesP of persons into their model of social interactions. The OfiHed agentsP do not react
to other peoplePs behavior. Their decisions are Ofar too certainP to alloE themselves to be affected
by others. Other individualsP decisions are uncertain, hoEever, and they are therefore more easily
influenced by the average behavior in the reference group. In other studies, the various OtypesP are
detected by looking at hoE many people actually behave in a conditionally cooperative Eay in a
laboratory eHperiment dealing Eith conditional cooperation.7 We use a different approach to
obtain a proHy for the OtypeP of subbects. In the panel data set, Ee use past behavior as a proHy for
hoE certain or uncertain people are. People Eho never contributed, or those Eho alEays
contributed Ehen they had a chance to do so, are eHpected to react more like OfiHed agentsP than
people Eho seem to be more unsure and changed their behavior at least once.
*IdURE 2
Past behavior indicates in hoE many previous decision situations the subbect decided to
contribute. This is captured by a coefficient ranging from 0 to 1. Wccordingly, a coefficient of e.g.
0.5 indicates that this particular individual contributed in half of the decision situations in Ehich
                                                
7 Wshraf, Bohnet and Piankov :2002@ use dictator game giving of individuals to eHplain behavior in trust games.
Similar to our approach, they use revealed behavior to undertake a Eithin-subbect analysis.
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he or she Eas involved. *igure 2 shoEs the distribution of OtypesP in the total student population.
1ore than 50 percent of the students contributed in all previous decisions. Wround ten percent
never contributed to either of the tEo *unds. The rest fall someEhere in betEeen. The subbects
Eho are more indifferent Eith regard to the contributions are eHpected to be more inclined to
react to the induced beliefs.
1odel I in Table 4 controls for this past behavior. The dependent variable is 1 if students
contributed to at least one of the *unds, and is 0 otherEise. The probit model incorporates only
students Eho are the subbects of one of the tEo treatments. The effect of the 1-+81<+01 64"#!7
:U4j@ is compared to the reference treatment Ehere students receive the information that feE
others :4Uj@ contributed :1-+81<+01;6)%&7@. Ws the coefficients of a probit analysis are not easy
to interpret, the computed marginal effect shoEs hoE much the probability of a contribution
changes compared to the reference group.
TWBcE 4 WBOUT HERE
The results of the conditional logit model are supportedI people contribute statistically
significantly more to the tEo *unds Ehen many others do so as Eell. The marginal effect of 4.U
percentage points is large Ehen taking into account that the decision does not leave much room
for reaction and the intervention is not strong. Table 4 also shoEs that past behavior is indeed an
important determinant of behavior. This result again confirms that students are not prone to
behavioral changes once they have taken an initial decision. The change from an induced
cooperation rate of 4Uj to U4j can be compared to a change of the elicited eHpectation of the
same magnitude. HoE much does the probability of contributing change Ehen students either
believe that 4Uj of other students contribute or Ehen they believe U4j of other students
contributet 1odel II shoEs the probit model Eith the elicited beliefs incorporated as an
1Z
independent variable. Ws the marginal effect of a one-percentage change in eHpectations is 0.U
percentage points, the change from 4Uj to U4j Eould be a change in the probability of
contributing of around 11 percentage points. This effect is more than double the behavioral
change actually occurring due to conditional cooperation. The correlation betEeen elicited
eHpectations and behavior therefore greatly overestimates the effect of Oconditional cooperationP.
This can be eHplained by a Ofalse consensusP effectI onePs oEn behavior to a certain eHtent
influences the eHpectations about others. The OtypeP of person therefore not only influences the
pro-social behavior but also the eHpectation about the pro-social behavior of others. In 1odel III
of Table 4, Ee control for the OtypeP of person by incorporating the coefficient of past behavior in
the probit model. In this specification, the marginal effect of a one-percentage change in
eHpectations is 0.3 percentage points. NoE a change in eHpectations from 4Uj to U4j Eould
correspond to a change in the probability of contributing of around 5 percentage points. This
effect is more in line Eith the behavioral change due to induced beliefs, because the coefficient of
past behavior captures part of the Ofalse consensusP effect.
In order to illustrate Eho reacts the most sensitively to the behavior of others, *igure 3 shoEs the
behavioral differences betEeen individuals in treatment group 64"#!7 versus 6)%&7= dependent on
past behavior. The figure confirms the eHpectation that subbects Eho never :cq0@ or alEays :cq1@
contributed are not very sensitive to othersP behavior. In contrast, subbects Eho changed their
behavior in the past pay more attention to othersP behavior, according to the theory of conditional
cooperation. Especially people Eho contributed less than half of the time but not never :0scs0.5@
behave in a very conditional Eay to the behavior of others. The sensitivity toEards the behavior
of others tends to decline, the more that people contributed in the past. This pattern is consistent
Eith the findings of the previous section that conditional cooperation Eorks 8/,<<+1-"98$$,I for
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some people, the norm to contribute due to Oconditional cooperationP is stronger than for others.
People Eho are already more Eilling to behave pro-socially do not care that much about the pro-
social behavior of others, even Ehen they knoE that the mabority are free-riding. In contrast,
people Eho tend not to contribute are much more influenced by the pro-social behavior of others.
This result is in line Eith evidence on social comparisons in the Eorking sphere, suggesting that,
due to peer pressure, an induced high productivity norm increases the productivity of the least
productive subbect, but a loE productivity norm does not have much influence on the most
productive subbects :*alk and Ichino, 2003@.
*IdURE 3 WBOUT HERE
The finding that sensitivity to the pro-social behavior of others declines the more that individuals
contributed in the past is supported by a probit model. 1odel 1 in Table 5 shoEs the respective
model Eith an interaction term betEeen >-+81<+01;64"#!7;?;@%+AA"9"+01;%A;58/1;2+!8B"%-. The
effect of the treatment declines Eith the coefficient of past behavior, as already shoEn in *igure
3. The boint hypothesis of Treatment 64"#!7, and the interaction effect not being \ero, is
statistically significant at the 90j-level :χ2 q 4.Z7] ps 0.0Z7Z@. HoEever, if Ee eHclude the
subbects Eho never contributed in the past, the relationship gets much clearer. 1odel 2 in Table 5
shoEs the respective estimate. Especially the coefficient of the interaction term >-+81<+01;64"#!7
?;@%+AA"9"+01;%A;58/1;2+!8B"%- shoEs that the more individuals contributed in the past, the less
sensitive they are in reacting to the behavior of others.
TWBcE 5 WBOUT HERE
One Eay to interpret this asymmetry is to assume that all students are conditional cooperators.
HoEever, individuals have heterogeneous thresholds as to Ehen they are Eilling to cooperate,
given the behavior of others. Some are Eilling to cooperate if only a small minority do so as Eell,
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Ehile others cooperate only Ehen a clear mabority do so. In the field eHperimental setting, only
people Ehose threshold is betEeen 4Uj and U4j react to the treatments. Students Eho have a
threshold beloE 4Uj contribute to the *unds independent of the treatments and students Eho
have thresholds above U4j also do not care about the induced beliefs. This leaves a subgroup of
the Ehole population Eho respond to the pro-social behavior of others. Tepending on the
distribution of the thresholds, this subgroup may be very small. If the coefficient of past behavior
is correlated Eith the thresholds, it may eHplain Ehy only certain OtypesP react to the induced
beliefs in the field eHperiment.
7" ;3-<&:6$3-
This paper presents evidence from a large-scale field eHperiment on conditional cooperationI
people behave pro-socially conditional on the pro-social behavior of other persons. When
students are presented Eith the information that many others donated to tEo Social *unds at the
University of Zurich, their Eillingness to contribute increases compared to the situation Ehere
students get the information that only a feE others contributed. This constitutes one of the first
tests of Osocial interactionP and conditional cooperation in a field eHperiment. The result that
people cooperate conditionally on others can be refined by three empirical findingsI
1. People increase their Eillingness to behave pro-socially Ehen presented Eith many
others Eho do so, but their pro-social behavior is not destroyed Ehen they knoE that
only feE others behave in this Eay. People therefore only compare themselves
OupEardsP to people Eho behave in a more pro-social Eay. Thus conditional
cooperation Eorks asymmetrically.
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2. There are some OtypesP of people Eho change their behavior due to the pro-social
behavior of other persons. Only individuals Eho are uncertain about Ehat decision to
make react conditionally on othersP behavior. Past revealed behavior can be used as a
suitable proHy for the OtypeP of peopleI individuals Ehose decisions changed at least
once in the past Eere especially sensitive to conditional cooperation.
3. Those Eho never contributed, or alEays contributed, in the past are almost totally
insensitive to the behavior of others] their oEn behavior is fiHed.
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Table 1: Treatment groups for testing ‘conditional cooperation’
Yontribution rate by others to Social *unds
OHighP OcoEP
64 %
:1000@
46 %
:1000@
U%1+I Number of subbects in parentheses.
Table 2: Summary statistics for winter term 2002/03
Personal characteristics Yontrol
group
Treatment
OHighP
Treatment
OcoEP
Treatment
EHpectation
Observations 19Z55 Z7Z Z7U 431
Number of semesters 10.01Z
:Z.5U1@
11.530
:7.973@
11.40U
:Z.2Z9@
11.325
:7.U93@
Wge 27.291
:9.575@
27.U9Z
:U.Z19@
27.ZZ7
:U.7Z7@
27.Z2U
:7.1U0@
dender :q*emale@ 52.Uj 49.3j 51.Uj 49.0j
Yoefficient of past behavior 0.732
:0.35Z@
0.73Z
:0.35Z@
0.74Z
:0.353@
0.U9U
:0.37Z@
U%1+/I Standard deviations in parentheses.
G%:-9+I OEn eHperiment and data provided by the accounting department of the University of
Zurich.
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Table 3: Conditional Cooperation
Tichotomous dependent variableI Yontribution to at least one *und
Yonditional logit model Eith personal fiHed effect
Variable Yoefficient
:\-value@
Pwx\x
>-+81<+01;64"#!7 :U4j@ 0.3U333
:2.73@
0.00U
>-+81<+01;6)%&7 :4Uj@ -0.0U3
:-0.4Z@
0.U33
Personal fiHed effects included
Semester dummies included
N 71,U5Z
cog likelihood -2U9Z1.4Z3
U%1+/I Test of differences for treatment;64"#!7;- 6)%&7 q 0.0I
χ2:1@ q 5.44, ps 0.0197
)+B+$;%A;/"#0"A"9809+I 3 0.01sps0.05, 33 ps0.01
Table 4: Conditional Cooperation Controlling for Past Behavior
Tichotomous dependent variableI Yontribution to at least one *und
Probit estimate
1odel I 1odel II 1odel III
Variable Yoeff.
:\-value@
1arginal
effect
Yoeff.
:\-value@
1arginal
effect
Yoeff.
:\-value@
1arginal
effect
>-+81<+01;64"#!7 :U4j@ 0.1Z033
:2.20@
4.Uj
>-+81<+01;6)%&7 :4Uj@ Reference group
Elicited EHpectations 0.021533
:5.17@
0.Uj 0.012Z3
:2.31@
0.3j
Yoefficient of past
behavior
2.72133
:24.30@
U9.1j 2.Z2133
:Z.95@
U3.Zj
Yonstant -1.1U233
:-12.59@
N 1754 250 250
cog likelihood -594.2Z409 -122.02U0Z -70.23U7Z5
2U
G%:-9+I see Table 1.
)+B+$;%A;/"#0"A"9809+I 3 0.01sps0.05, 33 ps0.01
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Table 5: Some Respond More than Others to the Behavior of Others
Tichotomous dependent variableI Yontribution to at least one *und
Probit estimate
1odel 1 1odel 2 eHcluding subbects
Eho never contributed
Variable Yoeff.
:\-value@
1arginal
Effect
Pwx\x Yoeff.
:\-value@
1arginal
Effect
Pwx\x
>-+81<+01;64"#!7 :U4j@ 0.19Z
:1.23@
5.0j 0.219 0.5333
:2.27@
10.7j 0.023
>-+81<+01;6)%&7 :4Uj@ Reference group
Yoefficient of past behavior 2.73533
:17.27@
U9.5j 0.000 3.19333
:13.Z9@
U3.Uj 0.000
Interaction Treatment OHighP 3
Yoefficient of past behavior
-0.02Z
:-0.13@
-0.7j 0.Z99 -0.424
:-1.39@
-Z.4j 0.1U5
Yonstant -1.17133
:-9.95@
0.000 -1.55Z33
:-Z.55@
0.000
N 1754 1575
cog cikelihood -594.27U -504.530
G%:-9+I see Table 1.
)+B+$;%A;/"#0"A"9809+I 3 0.01sps0.05, 33 ps0.01
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Figure 1: Correlation between Expectations and Behavior
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Figure 3: Different reactions to others' 
behavior
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